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Second Best Energy Policies 
V. Salas and A. Whinston 
Abstract 
The paper considers the problem of resource 
allocation when factor groups attempt to obtain a 
share of real income which is greater than what 
would be imputed by classical economies. A for- 
mulation stressing the Divvy nature of the problem 
is given both in theoretical terms and with a 
framework which is susceptible to empirical 
estimation. Policy questions resulting from the 
formation of OPEC are discussed and a framework 
for policy analysis is given. 
1 . Introduction 
Classical economic theory argues that for an economy to 
achieve an efficient level of production and distribution a 
necessary condition is that factor inputs should be remunerated 
based on their marginal product. The behavioral model under- 
lying this so-called competitive solution is a continuous 
supply of the factor input at different factor prices. The 
supply is determined for a given price with the equilibrium 
resulting from the mutual determination of supply and demand. 
Even though deviation from the competitive model will effect 
the overall efficiency of the economic system, there has 
been recently increasing efforts by input factor groups to 
improve their total welfare at the expense of other groups. 
For example, labor unions controlling a particular factor 
input offer the total supply at a particular wage structure. 
If agreement is not reached the factor is withdrawn (strike). 
The willingness of the employer group to accept the factor 
demands depends on the eventual damage that a withdrawal 
would cause. A prominent example of a factor group controlling 
a raw material input is OPEC. Again there is an attempt to 
increase the share of real output flows that the group can 
control to the detriement of the consumeErgroups of indus- 
trial nations. 
What those examples would suggest is the need of inte- 
grating political and economic considerations in 
the problems of resource allocation and welfare distribution. 
Divvy Economy [ 6 ]  would be an example of how a political bar- 
gaining process constrains the solution to the economic problem. 
The Divvy approach provides a very valuable conceptual frame- 
work for analysis that we think is important to pursue. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a framework of 
analysis for problems arising from factor rewards which are 
influenced by non-economic elements and which differ from the 
reward structure assumed in a competitive economic model. 
Our goal is the development of a model of an economic system 
incorporating these phenomena and allowing for the determination 
of economic policy which can adapt the system to these new 
realities'. The form of the model we present will allow for 
its elaboration so that it could eventually be amenable to 
statistical study. For this reason we develop a fairly general, 
though static, model of an economic system incorporating a con- 
sumer and producer sector. In the first part of the paper 
we discuss the input-output framework and its relationship to 
the general equilibrium model used in economics. Starting 
with a general equilibrium description incorporating a new 
constraint relating factor inputs to outputs, an input-output 
model results from the choice of a special functional form 
to represent the production technology. On the other hand 
more complex specifications of econometric production function 
lead to models which can be perceived as generalizations of 
traditional input-output analysis. The form and derivations 
of the extension of input-output models is described in 
section 2. 
In section 3 we analyze the effect of one factor group's 
demand on the production sector of an economic system. We 
want to present the framework for economic policies which 
reduce the distortion effect of the political demands. The 
particular form of this factor demand is represented as an 
extra constraint. A new second best optimization problem is 
formed and the necessary optimality conditions are determined. 
While a considerable amount of literature has been 
accumulated which concentrates on theoretical questions sur- 
rounding the theory of the Becond Best, relatively little has 
been attempted in the way of a framework for developing con- 
crete economic policies. By introducing a notation that allows 
for a disaggregated model and by relating the input-output 
framework to general equilibrium models we allow for the even- 
tual formulation of specific second best policies. 
The final part of the paper discusses the questions 
concering the practical application of the results. 
2. General Equilibrium Modelling 
Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the inter- 
related subparts that constitute a General Equilibrium Model, 
GEM. The model is static in the sense that no explicit ref- 
erence is made about the behavior of the economic units. Rather, 
they are assumed to interact in the "black boxes" representing 
the input resources and final goods markets. The outcomes of 
the behavior of the markets are a set of prices of inputs X 
and outputs p for which supply and demand for inputs (rs and 
r respectively) are equal, and supply and demand for outputs d 
(YS and Y ) are also equal. Exogenous variables are those D 
out of control of the system and those under control of the 
policy maker. A is a n x n matrix of interindustry flows per 
unit of sector output (for sector 1 to n), and R is a m x n 
matrix of primary input flows. The column [a. j:r. jl ' = b. j 
is a vector representing the technological coefficients of 
sector j. Input-output models with substitution provide for 
various b. in each industry. For given values of YD, equation j - 
x = (I - A) 'yD gives the vector of activity levels for sectors 
i = 1, ..., n. x can be used to evaluate the primary inputs 
requirements from the equation r = RX. Detail on input-output 
modeling and computation can be found in [lo]. 
Traditional applications of input-output models have taken 
the technological coefficients as fixed, independent of the 
relative prices of competitive inputs. This assumption has been 
used in practice in the way to compute those coefficients. The 
coefficient aij would be the ratio between input to sector j 
from sector i and the total inputs of j, for some observed data 
values. 
The purpose of this section is to show the relationships 
between the coefficients of A and R with the formulation of 
the resource allocation problem by a profit maximization model, 
and to evaluate a general equilibrium model that has used this 
result. 
Suppose we have for sector j, 
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where F is the production function for sector j  and represents j 
the technological possibilities. (2.2) gives the necessary con- 
I 
ditions where Fji is the derivative of F with respect to input i. j 
Under the assumption of concavity on F (2.2) are sufficient j ' I 
conditions. Homogenity of F j on xi would give 1 Fjixij = F i j 
and 
Substituting this value for w in (2.2) we have 
or in real terms, 
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) give the elements of A in mone- 
tary and real terms respectively. As we see, they depend on 
the form of the production technology. For example, if Fi is 
a J 
of the Cobb-Douglas form x 
= Hxij 
ij 'iXij then - = a ij which j pi xi 
is a parameter. However, for more general fo;ms of F like j 
the Transcendental Logarithmic [4] 
I Lnx = a + aijLnxij + - L L BiQjLnxijLnx j o g i  Q j (2.5) 
then 
which is clearly dependent on the values of xii. 
- 
The results above show that the evaluation of aij and r 
x~x,, k j 
by computing I IJ would be consistent with the assumption of 
Pi xi 
J J 
a Cobb-Douglas form of the production function in which case 
the input shares are independent of the prices. For general 
forms of technology the result would not be correct. 
The generalization of the input-output coefficients is a 
simple but rather important result. Diewert [8] suggested a 
generalized Leontief production function but used the dual cost 
function associated with it (more precisely its approximation) 
X ij to compute the coefficients which in his case were given as 
j 
a function of the prices of the inputs. Hudson and Jorgenson [9] 
use the dual Transcendental Cost function to compute the 
coefficients as a function of the prices; the coefficients were 
then evaluated simultaneously with the prices. The practical 
application of their model in creating scenarios that would 
provide a basis for energy policy formulation uses the compu- 
tational advantage of an input-output table together with more 
general assumptions on the form of the production technology 
for each sector. 
The consumer side of the GEM is formulated in terms of the 
utility maximization behavior of the consumption units subject 
to their budget constraint, for a given set of prices that 
satisfy the market equilibrium conditions between supply and 
demand. In [9], a transcendental logarithmic form of utility 
function is used. 
GEM as presented above makes the important assumption that 
the economic units (consumers and producers) interact in com- 
petitive markets and the resulting allocation of resources is 
strictly determined by economic and technological forces. 
However, the presence of political factors in this process and 
their influencing of the results is not given the attention that 
the empirical evidence of its importance would suggest. Divvy 
Economy [5] would be a preliminary attempt in the direction 
of including the political constraints into the system, but as 
is shown in [I21 the statement of those constraints in mone- 
tary terms and the flexibility on the sizes of the consumer 
groups to freely vary implies that they do not affect the real 
results. Political or institutional constraints should be 
stated in real terms and the resource allocation should be done 
under the assurance that they are satisfied. If the constraint 
can be relaxed it should be done so to begin with. But if the 
constraint can not be eliminated, the results obtained without 
assuring it is satisfied may not be meaningful. Moreover, if 
our interest is policy formulation we want to use models to 
evaluate alternatjves whose consequences we know satisfy the 
full set of constraints. 
The economic theory of the Second Best can provide a frame- 
work for modeling resource allocation problems under the presence 
of constraints that do not appear in competitive markets. In 
[ 2 ]  optimal pricing under the presence of the Government's 
budget constraint is discussed. In [61 the problem of monopo- 
listic behavior is discussed. But until the present, there 
has not been any empirical study of quantitative policy evalu- 
ation under situations where not all the decision units follow 
the Paretian rules. 
In the coming section we develop some GEM models in the 
field of energy policy and advance some preliminary results 
that would allow quantitative evaluation of policies under 
situations when only second best results are possible. 
3. A Second Best Model on Distribution 
The GEN presented in section 2 formalizes the resource 
allocation problem under the assumption of competitive market 
conditions. Under them, the decision units, producers and 
consumers, take prices as given and choose the quantities of 
inputs and outputs by solving their respective behavioral models. 
An important property of the competitive market is the achieve- 
ment of a Pareto optimal allocation of resources [8] in a com- 
pletely decentralized manner; that is by each decision unit 
using an optimal decision rule which involves only - its decision 
variables, (independent of the decisions of the others). The 
market mechanism together with technological constraints also 
determine the optimal distribution of welfare among social 
groups. This distribution is directly related to what each 
group receives as a remuneration from its participation in the 
production process in terms of its marginal contribution to it. 
The unrealistic nature of the assumptions characterizing 
a competitive economy have been extensively recognized. In 
the previous section we have outlined the new directions that 
the modeling of the allocation process may take. Numerous 
examples exist on how the bargaining at the political level 
for shares of welfare among social groups modifies the strictly 
economic solution. This politization has been aided by the 
growth in the relative importance of the government which not 
only provides services but administers taxes and subsidies 
creating considerable transfers of income among groups. The 
understanding of the ways by which each group imposes its 
demands is still limited, but it seems to rely upon the damaging 
effects on the economic system that would result from the with- 
drawal of the resource controlled by the demanding group. 
Union strikes and walk outs would be examples of such with- 
drawals. 
A strong motivation for modelling the resource allocation 
by economic and political bargaining has been the behavior 
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
controlling the price of oil to assure themselves a share 
of the welfare of the world. In this section we formalize 
the OPEC demands and show how they would be translated into 
an additional constraint that would distort the allocation 
of resource in the productive sector. Although the model is 
built around a particular example, it could be easily gener- 
alizable to similar cases where the demands are stated in 
terms of shares. The framework used is the Economic Theory 
of the Second Best which also provides a methodology for 
systematic definition of policies. 
Consider the welfare problem 
max U(zij) 
Subject to E zij 5 yi 
j=1 Vi 
The objective function represents an aggregate utility 
index for the countries of the world, j = 1, ..., r. The 
aggregation factor is the reciprocal of the marginal utility 
of income for each country1, which converts the value of the 
utility function from utils to monetary units. 
'ij is the 
consumption of good i,i = 1, ..., n; in country j. Constraint 
J 
(3.1.1) is an availability constraint in final good if i = 1, ..., n. 
(3.1.2) gives the aggregate production of the vector of out- 
puts y as a function of the vector of inputs x. F(y,x) is 
assumed to be a continuous, concave,separable and homogeneous func- 
n ,  
tion of y and x, i.e.. F(y.x) = Fl (y) - F2(x) with E Fliyi = Fl ( y ) .  
i= 1 
I 
E F2RxR = F2(:r). (3.1.3) is the resource availability constraint 
51'1 
for input R, R = I,...,m and h R is a parameter. 
Unless specified by the 2erivative sign, superscriptt 
will denote derivative and subindex if R, j will be combined 
to represent the variable with respect to which we take the 
derivative. 
The necessary conditions for (3.1) are, after multiplying 
by the respective variables, 
where p, w, X are the vectors of dual variables of (3.1.1), 
(3.1.2) and (3.1.3) respectively. 
If xk represents input factor oil, X x will be the total k k  
revenue assigned to that input factor. We will assume that 
this is the total revenue of the OPEC countries. This does 
not seem an unreasonable assumption given the present level 
of specialization of those countries. 
In our utility function 63binfiex j = k will identify 
the OPEC group which consumes goods i = 1, ..., nk. From (3.2) 
we can obtain the relation between the level of income of 
group k and its share of total welfare 
or in relative terms 
C C U Z  C PiYi j i=1 Pj ij i=l 
where L L -  p.z = L piyi = L hRxe is the aggregate in- 
j i=l 1 ij i=l R= 1 
come. Equation (3.3) shows that the share of welfare for 
group k is proportional to its share of income over the total 
world consumption. This intuitive result can be used to under- 
stand the behavior of a group like OPEC where consumption de- 
pends on the imports of final goods from which it derives a 
level of welfare. The increase in oil prices should not be 
seen as merely increasing their monetary income, but as a way 
of maintaining a stable or increasing share of welfare with 
respect to the rest of the world. Similar conclusions can be 
made if we look at the indirect utility function2 for the k th 
group, Vk(pl, ...,ph ,Ik). To maintain a certain value for V 
k k implies the maintenance of a certain relationship between the 
income of the group and the level of prices of the goods it 
consumes. Thus claims of raw material exporting countries 
for an indexing of raw material prices to prices of industrial 
goods can be seen as an attempt to fix a level of indirect 
utility. 
The value of the share of real income that the OPEC group 
is able to fix is the result of a political process in which 
OPEC's bargaining power is based in the damaging effect that 
an oil embargo (withdrawal of the resource) would be for the 
world economies.' The rest of the world acknowledges this 
power and has shown willingness to negotiate an indexing of 
the price of oil with the prices of selected commodities 
(presumably those entering the utility function of the OPEC 
group) . 
Although the outcome of the bargaining is not determined 
in t.his paper, it is likely to arrive at a political arrange- 
ment different from the one determined by the market mechanisms. 
That is, if U is the share of welfare under market conditions j - 
for group j , and is then negotiated, U = KU . where K f 1, j j I 
and most likely > 1. Our interest now is to show how this 
would effect the production sector. From (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) 
we have 
The l e f t  hand s i d e  o f  ( 3 . 4 )  w i l l  be  a f f e c t e d  by K = ~ . / u  s o  
I j f  
w e  have t h e  d e v i a n t  form of ( 3 . 4 )  t o  be  w r i t t e n  a s  
Although t h e  r e s u l t  o f  ( 3 . 5 )  h a s  been j u s t i f i e d  i n  t e r m s  
of  a l l o c a t i o n  of w e l f a r e  i n  a  wor ld  b a s i s ,  w e  can impose a  
c o n s t r a i n t  i n  t h e  form of ( 3 . 5 )  f o r  each  coun t ry .  The r e s u l t s  
g i v e n  below would ap p l y  t h e n  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  economy. 
To look a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  ( 3 . 5 )  on t h e  p roduc t i on  s e c t o r  
w e  can s o l v e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  problem f o r  g i v e n  v a l u e s  o f  h and 
p  ( d u a l  v a r i a b l e s  of  (3 .1 .1 )  and ( 3 . 1 . 3 ) ) .  
s u b j e c t  t o  F ( y , x )  = 0 
The n ece s sa r y  c o n d i t i o n s  on (3 .6 )  a r e ,  f o r  t h e  m u l t i p l i e r s  w 
and v ,  
i ~ n  k 
together with the constants (3.6.1) and (3.6.2). , 
Gixi 
- We recall that given a function G(x), ei - - is the 
GI I 
G.G 
- l j  elasticity of G(x) with respect to xi, and oij - -is the 
GGij 
Allen Elasticity of Substitution of i by j.4 We can substitute 
for the new parameters in the necessary conditions above, so 
we would have, after simplification 
where F  i s  t h e  i n d e x  v a 1 3 ~ e  of  t o t a l  o u t p u t :  F  = F1 ( y )  = F  ( x )  2  
under  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  ( 3 . 6 . 1 )  i s  of  t h e  form F1 ( y )  - F2 ( x )  = 0  
4 
( s e p a r a b i l i t y  o f  i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s ) .  a '  i s  t h e  r e c i p r o c a l  of  
a d e f i n e d  above.  
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 3 . 5 . 1 )  and ( 3 . 8 . 3 )  i n  ( 3 . 6 . 2 )  w e  can  s o l v e  
f o r  v: 
and 
Using (3 .10)  i n  ( 3 . 8 )  w e  can o b t a i n  t h e  second b e s t  r e l a -  
t i v e  s h a r e s  
where 
For K = 1 ,  u  = 0 ( 3 . 1 1 ) ,  (3 .12)  would j u s t  be t h e  f i r s t  
b e s t  r e s u l t s .  However, a s  w e  j u s t i f i e d  b e f o r e ,  it i s  expec ted  
K > 1  from t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  p roce s s  so t h e  f i r s t  b e s t  r e s u l t s  
would no l o n g e r  ho ld .  
Equat ion (3.11) and (3 .12)  g i v e  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  pro- 
d uce r  e q u i l i b r i u m  under t h e  second b e s t .  A s  w e  s e e ,  t h e  f i r s t  
e R b e s t  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  i n p u t s  - a r e  " c o r r e c t e d "  by t h e  v a l u e  
1  + ua 1  ek 
ek which depends on t h e  o u t p u t  e s t a s t i c i t i e s  and t h e  
1  + ua 1  kk 
A l l en  e l a s t i c i t i e s  of s u b s t i t u t i o n .  That  i s ,  f o r  any two 
f a c t o r s  q  and t ,  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  from t h e  f i r s t  b e s t  w i l l  be 
1  l a r g e r ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  k, f o r  t h e  f a c t o r  w i th  l a r g e r  aRk .  
, where o Q k  i s  t h e  A l l e n  e l a s t i c i t y  of O r ,  s i n c e  o1 = -
R k  %.k 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  between R and k, t h e  d e v i a t i o n  w i l l  be g r e a t e r  
f o r  t h e  f a c t o r  w i t h  lower  e l a s t i c i t y  of  s u b s t i t u t i o n  w i t h  o i l .  
Similarly, from (3.1.2), the ratios of shares of final goods 
are appropriately modified, depending on the sum of elasticities 
of transformation of the final good with the commodities in- 
side the index. Note also that if for factors q and t, 
t q t k t  otk = o the relative shares between t and q will 
s k  
still be the same as in the first best. 
The Allen elasticity of substitution is a parameter which 
will depend on the form chosen to represent the technology. 
" Bi 
For example, for a Cobb-Douglas function Fl(y) = II yi , 
"R i=l F2(x) = I x , the elasticities of substitution between i 
R=l 
and j and R and k are constant and equal to one, for i j and 
B i t k while oii and oQR are - "R and - respectively. For 1-Bi 1 -aR 
the Transcendental Logarithmic function, however, the elasti- 
city of substitution is a variable that depends on the share 
value of the factor (or output). For example, for the function 
given in (2.5) , the elasticity of substitution between i and 
k would be oik = I ~ ~ M ~ /  ( Bjik + Miplk) where M~ is the share of i. 
The selection of the form of the production technology 
becomes then a major issue. From the computational point of 
view, the Cobb-Douglas form is the most attractive. An exten- 
sion of the Cobb-Douglas is the Constant Elasticity of Sub- 
stitution production function, CES [2] which still has 
constant elasticity of substitution between the variables, 
but is not restricted to the value of one. The Transcendental 
Logarithmic Frontier [5], the Generalized Leontief function [91 
or the function given in [12] would all allow for variable 
elasticities of substitution and consequently will be 
more general, but would also have more computational difficulty. 
At this point it may be important to mention the use of 
the concept of duality [I21 in general equilibrium modeling. 
In [10], Hudson and Jorgenson use transcendental logarithmic 
functions to represent the profit frontier as a second order 
approximation of an arbitrary profit function. Presumably 
this would be the dual form of a production function in terms 
of inputs and outputs. This representation allows then to 
write the share values for the inputs as functions of the 
prices and consequently allows share values to vary according 
to substitution effects when there are changes in those prices. 
The prices are originally obtained from the solutions 
of a set of general equilibrium equations in the dual space. 
The general equilibrium in the primal space (physical inputs 
and outputs) is represented in a Leontief Input-Output table 
with variable coefficients (depending on prices). No check 
is made however, after the computation of the activity levels 
whether the dual prices associated with the solution coincide 
with the prices in the dual problem originally solved. In 
general, it does not seem likely for them to coincide at first; 
however it would be expected for them to converge through an 
iterative procedure similar to the one used to prove the 
existence of a general equilibrium solution using the fixed 
point theorem. Finally a remark on the empirical evidence [ 4 1  
of observed differences on the estimated values of cross- 
elasticities of substitution when they are estimated from the 
profit frontier and when they are estimated from the production 
frontier. The sensitivity of the parameter to this choice 
when it should be indifferent should be clarified before 
further use of the Transcendental Logarithmic function is made. 
In our model we gave the results in terms of the primal 
problem represented by the transformation technology. The 
application of the model would require the selection of a 
particular form for F(y,x) = 0. The choice of a function with 
variable elasticities of substitution would make equations 
(3.11) and (3.12) nonlinear since u and a would be functions 
of x and y, which would create a computational problem. A 
certain compromise could be achieved by using a CES function 
where yi and are parameters - > 0 and L yi = L && = 1. 
R=l R=l 
The elasticity of substitution is related.to the parameter p ,  
a = for all e, q, 2 + q, and the elasticity of trans- 
Rq v + 1  
formation to p  : a = for all i, j ,  i + j. ij 1 + p  
4. The Use of the Plodel in Policy Evaluation 
The main motivation of this work has been to try to relate 
political and economic considerations in a GEM. From the 
Theory of the Second Best we have introduced a constraint in 
the economic model justified by political consideration. The 
new conditions for optimality can be estimated under certain 
restrictions in the technology used to represent the production 
sector. The conditions take explicitly into account the 
existence of the behavioral rule of OPEC trying to maintain 
certain levels of real surpluses transferred to them. The 
use of the model in a complete GEM framework (as the one in 
Figure 1) for policy evaluation will be now much more meaningful 
since the results shown by the different alternatives will be 
feasible results, that is, it will already incorporate the 
satisfaction of the OPEC demands. 
Apart from the adequate feasible set to evaluate policies, 
the Second Best provides a methodology to decide how to select 
a policy and where it should be directed. Below we will use 
theoretical results from the Second Best literature in the 
context of our practical problem of energy policy. We will 
represent our additional constraint (3.6.2) by m(y,x) where 
y = F(x) since it involves relationships between inputs and 
outputs. 
A. The possibility of restoring the first best result 
We have already argued that the existence of the constraint 
is a result of the bargaining power that the OPEC possesses. 
If OPEC attempted to satisfy its demands in the form of a 
one time boost in the price of oil, there would be an immediate 
policy dicision that would restore the first best result: 
adjust all the prices monetarily so that their relative position 
with respect to the new oil price is maintained as before [I]. 
The adjustment would propogate through the economic sectors 
modifiying also the prices of the final goods, but after the 
adjustment process no effect on the real sector would actually 
occur. The policy makers of the consuming countries have been 
somehow reluctant to expand the money supply in the amount 
required to make the compensation not only under the fear 
of inflation (which would be just apparent but not real) but 
under the fear that a new rise in the price of oil would follow 
from OPEC's realization that their relative advantage had been 
eliminated. To some extent current economic policies reflect 
this behavior. Pressures from inside countries to stimulate 
their economy and reduce unemployment that originally had 
increased as the result of anti-inflationary policies, forced 
the governments to make expansive decisions (including moderate 
increases in the money supply). In recent years there has been 
a high rate of price increase in most of the oil consuming 
nations that has made more expensive the imports by the OPEC 
group. The cartel has responded by a new price increase of 
oil. To avoid the spiral that those counter policies would 
stimulate the OPEC and the consuming countries have agreed 
to discuss the idea of indexing the price of oil in terms of 
the price of final goods. 
Our conclusion is that no restoration of the first best 
is possible and the discussion reinforces the need for the 
constraint to be explicitly taken into account. 
B. The identification of sectors not affected by the constraint 
The first order conditions of problem (3.6) involve the 
derivative of m(y,x). If the derivative is equal to zero for 
a certain variable, m(y,x) will not affect directly the 
optimality conditions. This would be the case for an indus- 
trial sector not included in the index as a final good and 
not using any oil or related products in tis process. Mathe- 
matically this is true for ys such that 
Also for the input such that it is not used in any final 
good, included in the index and does not substitute with oil; 
for x2 such that 
The set of variables satisfying those conditions above 
would be practically empty given the presence of oil as an 
input in most of the production process in a direct of indirect 
way. 
Following the arguments in [I], it can be said that the 
relative optimality conditions between variables i and j will 
still be first best if their rate of distortion is the same. 
In our case this would happen under the conditions of constant 
and equal elasticities of substitution and constant and equal 
elasticities of transformation (recall equations (3.11) and 
(3.12). This is a sufficient condition. 
As we mentioned before the elasticities of substitution 
and transformation are dependent on our assumption on the 
technology so in the verification of this condition we may 
introduce a certain bias. 
The identification of variables satisfying the first best 
results is important since in general it is not necessary to 
take policy actions to modify their decision rules. Note that 
the set of variables will have to have an equivalence class 
relation, i.e., the relative distortion will be the same 
among all the elements of the class. 
C. Policy recommendations 
Based on the theory of the Second Best specific recommen- 
dations to the policy maker on how to influence the behavioral 
rules of the economic units so that the second best solution 
is obtained in a decentralized manner can be made. The point 
is that if we let the market behave by itself, with the 
economic units allocating the resources under the guidance 
provided by observed prices as in the situations with perfect 
competition, not only the first best is not attainable, but 
neither the second best since the constraint is completely 
ignored. Our interest is to avoid the alternative of a com- 
pletely centralized resource allocation problem that would 
solve problem ( 3 . 6 )  and then would order the economic units 
to do exactly as specified in the second best conditions, but 
rather we want to preserve as much as possible of the decen- 
tralized nature of the resource allocation through a market 
mechanism. We thus have to focus on the design of what has 
been called "piecemeal" policy [ 8 1 .  That is, a policy by the 
coordinating unit that affects the decision variables of the 
economic units as if the constraint would have been explicitly 
taken into account. Further we want the new decision rule to 
still be only a function of the decision variables under the 
control of the single unit. 
The possibility of piecemeal policy is challenged in [ I ]  
where it is argued that it is precisely the impossibility of 
eliminating the decision variables of the deviant unit from 
the decision function of the others which imposes a second 
best solution and in the cases where this elimination is 
possible a first best result is obtained. 
More precisely, for the first best result for factor R 
we have 
while in our case we have 
where u is a function of xk and so will be oLR in the case 
of a variable elasticities of substitution production function. 
The price decision variable which is second best optimal de- 
pends then on xk, the decision variable of the deviant factor. 
If there is no piecemeal policy, what may be the role of 
the model in policy formulation for the sectors operating 
under second best? First of all it has already shown to be 
useful in identifying the sectors under first best. Second, 
it provides guidelines for policy and action as we will try 
to show. 
We have emphasized the possibility of integrating the 
producer vector model into a general equilibrium model which 
would explicitly take into account the existence of the con- 
straint. The model could then be used to make predictions on 
what the values of the input and output variables would be 
under certain assumptions on growth and consumption. The 
piecemeal policy could then be built around this preliminary 
result since we will have approximate values for the variables 
in equation ( 4 . 3 ) ,  as well as for the equivalent decision rules 
in the final goods sector. In the case where a would be vari- 
able the process would have to be iterative, starting with 
the values of the variables with no constraint and adjusting 
progressively the correction value in the shares until some 
equilibrium solution could be obtained. That would allow us 
1 
to compute the value SkR. This value would be administered 
R 
in the form of taxes and subsidies to be added to the prices 
of the input factors, and/or final goods. 
The use of a large scale integrated model of the economy 
to predict values for these variables which then would be 
used to compute policy values (taxes and subsidies) to administer 
a second best solution, may be an important tool to overcome 
the problem of information in implementing second best solutions. 
With the use of econometric models to represent and estimate 
utility and production functions the policy administrator can 
gain information on the behavior of the subunits, provided 
the model is correct in specifying the behavior. The process 
would be similar to an abstract solution of (3.6) by a cen- 
tralized unit, but the implementation would still be left to 
the economic units who would make the final choices under 
more realistic information. 
Some other suggestions can also be made about general 
policy. The need for direct regulation and the distortion in 
the economy will be minimized by increasing the size of the 
set of industries operating under first best rules (not affected 
by the constraint as discussed in B). The policies directed 
towards the encouragement of research and development of new 
energy sources that would substitute for oil as an input factor 
would contribute to reducing the distortion by increasing the 
number of industries for which (4.2) would hold. In the cases 
when this substitution could not be completed, the effort should 
be directed towards increasing the elasticity of substitution 
between oil and other inputs. The later is true since we 
have seen that the distortion is inversely proportional to 
this elasticity. As a corollary, the economy would become 
more oil independent and would lower the bargaining power of 
the resource controlling group forcing the value of the para- 
meter progressively closer to 1 and the effect of the con- 
straint would completely vanish. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In the previous sections we presented a Second Best model 
on factor share distribution together with a methodological 
framework for combining modeling with policy analysis so that 
second best solutions are attainable. 
The results are still theoretical, although some indication 
is given on how the model could be used to quantitatively 
evaluate policies. It is important to emphasize that the 
methodological procedure to evaluate policies would not be 
much different from what is done in other studies ([9] for 
example), but our framework should provide a basis for identi- 
fication of economic sectors whose first best rules are not 
affected by the additional constraint so no direct policy 
action would have to be taken for them. For the industries 
not included in this class, the difficulties of "piecemeal 
policy" are partially overcome by using the model to predict 
values of the decision variables of the deviant economic unit. 
This approximated value can then be used to find the second 
best optimal decisions of the other economic units (Equation 
(4.3)): Since the economic units can not be expected to take 
into account the overall constraint the role of the policy 
maker is to modify their behavioral rules to make them con- 
sistent with the new optimality condition. To do this, the 
policy maker would administer taxes and subsidies by the 
equivalent of the correction factor given by equations of the 
form (4.3). 
Finally, we point out the importance of technological 
specification in GEM, and the trade offs between generality 
and computability that the analyst will have to make in actual 
implementation. Another important practical consideration is 
the level of aggregation used to build the model, that is, the 
number of economic sectors and primary inputs selected as 
variables. 
All these remarks should make clearer the imaginative role 
that the analyst would still have to take in implementing the 
model and the important questions still left to his discretion, 
but we believe we have offered him a more realistic and theore- 
tically sound starting point. 
Footnotes 
1. For example we could write U(z) of the form 
where B ~ ~ o u l d  be the aggregation factor equal to the reciprocal j 
of the marginal utility of income for country j .  
2. The indirect utility function is derived by solving the 
problem, 
max Uk(yik) 
nk 
subject to L piyik 5 Ik 
i=l 
where Ik is the income level for the OPEC. The solution to 
(Pi Pnk), which is the representation of the ( 1 )  gives Vk r , . . . ,T 
utility in terms of prices of the final goods and income level 
allocated to consumption. Evaluation of Vk over time gives 
an index measure of the evolution of the welfare level for the 
group. The OPEC demands can thus be interpreted as stabilizing 
Vkls growth over time. 
3. It may be of interest to contrast the behavioral rule intro- 
duced in the paper with the situation where we have a monop- 
sony which is supplying the resource. The monopsony will 
have a perceived demand equation for its services, and will 
determine the quantity to supply by equating marginal revenue 
to marginal cost. For this quantity the price will be deter- 
mined from the demand equation. The behavioral rule of the 
monpsomist is not Paretian since it does not result in a 
quantity that maximizes the consumer surplus (this would be 
the quantity for which marginal cost euuals demand). The 
appropriation of part of the consumer surplus by the monop- 
sonist is an indirect result of the structure of the market 
(no competition on the side of the supply), but is consistent 
with the behavioral rule of profit maximization which pre- 
vails in the overall economy. 
In our case, the resource controlling group specifically 
bargains for a share of the world surplus, as it affects its 
level of utility. The indexing of the price of the resource 
is directly aimed at this appropriation, and in the bargaining 
process the group makes use of its knowledge of the damaging 
effect that the withdrawal of the resource would cause to 
the consumer groups forcing them to accept its conditions. 
4. The elasticity of substitution (a) is a number that measures 
the rate at which the substitution between inputs or between 
outputs takes place, and it is defined as the proportionate 
rate of change of the input ratio by the proportionate rate 
of change of the rate of technical substitution: 
in obtaining a we also make use of the property that F1(y) and 
F (x) in the main text are homogeneous [ J . P I .  Henderson, 2 
R.E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, p. 621.  
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